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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effects that Corporate Governance has on the outcome of 
Corporate Investment Decisions of Ghanaian Companies.  
This research is conducted on 19 Ghanaian companies sub-divided into Multinational and 
local Companies. Multiple regression analysis is used in this study in estimating the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and the outcome of investing 
decisions. The independent variables used which are Firm Size, Board Size, Board 
Independence, CEO Duality, Size of Audit Committee and the Independence of Audit 
Committee; represent the measure of corporate governance for this study. The results of 
this study show that for all 19 Ghanaian Firms, the Board Size, Board Independence and 
Size of Audit Committee are variables relevant in making sound investing decisions 
whose benefits companies can enjoy over a number of years. For multinationals, Board 
Independence, the Size of Audit Committee and the Independence of Audit Committee 
have positive relationships with investing decisions while for local companies the Board 
Size, Board Independence and the Independence of the Audit Committee are the 
variables having a positive relationship with the outcome of investment decisions. 
This paper adds to the limited evidence on the governance-performance relationship that 
exists in Ghana but approaches the topic by focusing mainly on the outcome of investing 
decisions (capital budgeting decisions). This study can inform governance policy making 
in Ghana. 
Keywords: Investment Decisions, Corporate Governance, Multiple Regression and Firm 
Performance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
The study and development of Corporate Governance began earnestly in developed 
economies like France, Germany, United States and the United Kingdom (Herrigel, 
2007). Due to increased industrialization, firms grew larger and larger making the 
classical entrepreneurial systems of owner-manager give way to a more dispersed system. 
Hence, the creation of the system of ownership separated from management. The 
separation of ownership from management gives rise to the ‘agency problem’. Every 
organization whether or not management is separated from ownership must be governed 
well for the organization to achieve the strategic and operational goals the organization 
was incorporated to achieve.  
Currently, in Africa, corporate governance has been widely accepted as it has 
implications for economic development and long-term growth (Okeahalem and 
Akinboade, 2003).  For instance, a survey was conducted in 2000 by the Institute of 
Directors (IOD) for top 100 companies and some state-owned enterprises to investigate 
the current state of corporate governance practices in both the private and public sectors. 
The survey revealed that corporate governance practice had gained grounds in Ghana and 
several sub-Saharan countries (Okeahalem and akinboade, 2003). Developing countries 
vary from developed countries in many ways and as such, there is the need for 
developing countries to develop their own corporate governance models that consider the 
cultural, political, and technological changes in each African country (Mulili and Wong, 
2011).  
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Modigliani and Miller (1958) “think of firms as collections of investment projects”. Two 
important decisions taken by the financial managers are the financing decisions and 
capital budgeting or investing decisions. According to Cooremans, (2009), capital 
budgeting decisions increases a firm's economic capacity and financial value and is 
equally and sometimes even more important than the financing measures a company 
adopts. Financial managers are constantly faced with the decision of how to allocate 
scarce corporate resources of a company in a governance system and environment that is 
increasingly placing pressure on them (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
The pursuit to provide answers to issues that improve firm performance in Ghana is still 
an ongoing process with volumes of literature written around the subject (Fiador, 2016). 
The factors according to research that affect firm performance range from 
macroeconomic factors to industry level factors, through to firm level factors (Fiador, 
2016). At the firm level, a factor central to the success or failure of a company is the 
firm’s investing decisions. An example of a successful outcome of an investing or capital 
budgeting decision was the development of the 757 and 767 jets by Boeing which 
increased stockholders investment by more than double and by the year 2002 the 
estimated cumulative profit for this investment project was estimated at $10 billion. 
Capital budgeting failures like that of Iridium Communications can have unfortunate 
consequences on the existence of an organization. A $5 billion investment in a satellite 
system saw the company filing for bankruptcy in less than a year (YouSigma, 2008). 
From the Iridium Communications example, the importance of the outcome of investing 
decisions is shown as they can affect the operations and the continued existence of an 
organization. Therefore, beyond governance systems, it is necessary to investigate the 
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possible returns or outcomes of a capital budgeting decision before implementation. 
Popular methods of valuing the feasibility of capital budgeting projects include the Net 
Present Value, Discounted Cash Flows, Payback Period, Internal rate of Return and the 
Profitability Index. These project appraisal techniques do not only access the financial 
returns of an investment project for a company but also the viability and feasibility.  
Corporate governance failures also come with their own repercussions on a firm. 
Scandals such as those of Enron and WorldCom are attributed to poor corporate 
governance and the failure to consider stakeholder concerns in decisions (Mulili and 
Wong, 2011). The more current corporate governance failures in Africa are the Saanbou 
Bank, Fidentia (accaglobal.com, 2016) and First Strut (Wet, 2013). Following these 
scandals, many governments have set up new regulations to align the interests of 
stakeholders with corporate conduct (Wulili and Wong, 2011).  
This study makes a contribution to the debate on the impact of corporate governance on 
firm performance particularly the outcome of a capital budgeting decision in a developing 
economy as Ghana’s.  The concept of corporate governance and capital budgeting 
decisions are necessary areas of study that require much needed attention from financial 
managers and corporate managers. Their implications on the success and profitability of 
companies worldwide can be costly or beneficial. Many studies in Africa relate corporate 
governance with company performance and the investors’ decision to invest in a 
company (Mulili and Wong, 2011). This paper, however, does differently by focusing on 
corporate governance systems and how they influence the outcome investing decisions in 
Ghana. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
 
Many notable scholarly articles written on the topic of corporate governance in Ghana 
establish the relationship between corporate governance and financing decisions (Abor, 
2007), corporate governance and disclosure practices (Aboagye-Otchere, Bedi and Ossei 
Kwakye, 2012), corporate governance and financial performance (Kyereboah-
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006) among others.  The different direction this study 
is taking is from the perspective of investing or capital budgeting decisions. According to 
Swain and Haka, (2000) “Capital Investment decisions is an activity that is crucial to 
future organizational variability, as indicated by the high level of time and resources 
typically committed by companies to the capital investment process.” Moreover, Myers, 
(1974) argues that there is a significant interaction between corporate financing and 
investment decisions and while the study by Abor, (2007) addresses Corporate 
Governance and Financing decisions, no study exists for investing decisions in Ghana. 
Also, the study by Kyereboah-Coleman, (2008) looked at governance and firm 
performance based on the various industry sectors in Ghana. However, there has not been 
any empirical study that divides the companies based on their firm size. The literary gap, 
therefore, is that no known empirical study discusses corporate governance and the 
outcome of capital budgeting decisions in one paper. Furthermore, another literary gap 
exists as governance studies have failed to categorize sample companies according to 
their firm size. A perspective from Lozano and Boni (2002) identifies that multinational 
enterprises have continued to grow and increase worldwide and have a clear competitive 
advantage over local companies The size of a company is also known to influence the 
capital budgeting process and the firm’s performance as a whole (Pike, 1987). 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
• To determine if there is a relationship between the factors of corporate 
governance and the outcome of investing decisions companies take. 
• To examine the different factors of corporate governance that may influence the 
outcome of investing decisions of multinationals as well as local companies.  
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
Various theories were propounded by many researchers to explain the reason why 
corporate governance may have an effect on the outcome of decisions made by managers. 
The theory for this research paper is the “Theory of Separation of Ownership and 
Control” by Fama and Jensen (1983). This theory explains the need to have a 
management separate from shareholders and to have a board of directors serving as a 
control mechanism. "Control of agency problems in the decision-making process is 
important when the decision managers who initiate and implement important decisions 
are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth 
effects of their decisions” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The hypothesis of the theory 
suggests that for large corporations and large professional partnerships etc., the control of 
the agency problem is done by having a separate body that takes up the ratification and 
monitoring of decisions taken on behalf of the residual claimants by management (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  This theory explains the nature of companies used in this study. The 
companies in this study have a management that makes decisions on behalf of 
shareholders while having the board of directors as the control mechanism. The Board, 
therefore, have the right to hire and fire and compensate top-level decision makers to 
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ensure that decisions (whether financial or investing decisions) made by managers are in 
the best interest of corporations. The Theory also explains the importance and function of 
Non-Executive Directors on the Board. The theory states that;  
“Corporate boards generally include outside members, that is, members who are 
not internal managers, and they often hold a majority of seats. The outside board 
members act as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and carry out 
tasks that involve serious agency problems between internal managers and 
residual claimants, for example, setting executive compensation or searching for 
replacements for top managers” (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
1.5 Research Hypothesis 
 
The basis for the hypothesis is the “Theory of Separation, Ownership and Control” by 
Fama and Jensen (1983) whose core proposition is that a good and effective governance 
system of a firm is one where ownership is separated from management and there is an 
efficient control mechanism representing the Board of Directors (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Once this theory exists in a corporation, managers are expected to make good 
decisions (whether financing or investing decisions) to create wealth for the shareholders 
of the corporation.  
As such the direction of the hypotheses of the various governance factors of this study 
vary based on the suggested effects the “Theory of Separation of Ownership and Control” 
by Fama and Jensen (1983) suggests. The principal hypothesis of this research is stated 
below; 
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HO = Corporate Governance has no positive significant effect on the outcome of capital 
budgeting decisions.  
HA = Corporate Governance has a positive significant effect on the outcome of capital 
budgeting decisions.  
The Individual Alternate Hypotheses for the independent variables are as follows; 
Firm Size - The common apex of the decision control systems of organizations, large and 
small are the Board of Directors. They are the mechanism that allows separation of the 
management and control of the organization's most important decisions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The Theory does not explicit explain the role of Firm Size in relations to 
efficient decision making. Firm Size is serving as a control variable and its Alternate 
Hypothesis is;  
HA = Firm Size is positively related to the outcome of investing decisions. 
Board Size - Even though the “Theory of Separation of Ownership and Control” by Fama 
and Jensen (1983) discusses extensively the control function of the Board in an 
organization, the theory fails to discuss how the size of the board can aid in their control 
functions. Hence the alternate hypothesis for the Board Size is; 
HA = Board Size is negatively related to the outcome of investing decisions. 
Board Independence - “The board is not an effective device for decision control unless it 
limits the decision discretion of individual top managers” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Per 
this statement, the Alternate Hypothesis for Board Independence is; 
HA = Board Independence is positively related to the outcome of investing decisions. 
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CEO Duality - “We contend that separation of decision and risk-bearing functions 
survives in organizations is in part because of the benefits of specialization of 
management and risk bearing” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). From the above quote, the 
theory focuses on the separation of ownership from management and control and not 
necessarily the separation of chairmanship from directorship as the concept of CEO 
duality explains. Hence, the Alternate Hypothesis for CEO Duality is; 
HA = CEO Duality is negatively related to the outcome of investing decisions. 
Size of Audit Committee - “In complex organizations valuable specific knowledge 
relevant to decision control is diffused among many internal agents. This generally means 
that efficient decision control, like efficient decision management, involves delegation 
and diffusion of decision control as well as separation of decision management and 
control at different levels of the organization” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Since the Audit 
Committee is a decision control mechanism at a different level of an organization, the 
alternate Hypothesis for the size of the Audit Committee is; 
HA = Size of the Audit Committee is positively related to the outcome of investing 
decisions.  
Independence of Audit Committee - “Corporate boards generally include outside 
members, that is, members who are not internal managers, and they often hold a majority 
of seats. Our hypothesis is that outside directors (NEDs) have the incentive to develop 
reputations as experts in decision control” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As per this statement 
from the theory, the Alternate hypothesis for Independence of the Audit Committee is; 
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HA = Independence of the Audit Committee is positively related to the outcome of 
investing decisions.  
1.6 Overview of Methodology 
 
This study uses quantitative methods in analyzing the topic and relies solely on secondary 
data. 
The population for this research is all companies operating in Ghana with a sample size 
of 19 companies consisting of 10 local and 9 multinational companies.  Data for the 
quantitative analysis was obtained from the financial statements of the companies over 5 
years (2011-2015). A panel regression was used to analyze the relationship between 
corporate governance and investing decisions. The independent variables which represent 
measures of corporate governance for this study are Board Size, Firm Size, Board 
Independence, CEO Duality, Size of Audit Committee and Independence of Audit 
Committee (Abor, 2007), (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008). The method of company 
selection was done by Convenience sampling. Convenience sampling was used to avoid 
the difficulty in obtaining financial statements of companies that had complicated 
bureaucratic processes.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
The main incentive for this study was the literary gap that existed in the study of 
corporate governance and investing decisions in Africa. This study is the first known in 
Ghana to examine the relationship corporate governance has on investing decisions. 
Mukherjee and Henderson (1987) highlight the need to simultaneously study capital 
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budgeting with corporate governance issues by asserting that “to understand what 
businesses do in capital budgeting, we must better understand the dynamics of corporate 
interactions” (Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987). Despite this 1987 statement no research 
has been done in that regard. 
The contribution of capital budgeting decisions to overall performance cannot be 
overlooked. With a better insight on the outcome of investing decisions, managers are 
more likely invest in more value maximizing projects and be more efficient in their 
operations in the short-run (Love, 2011). Also, fewer assets will not be wasted on non-
productive activities and investors are better protected and bear a less risk of losing their 
assets. Finally, the availability of external finance may be improved allowing firms to 
undertake an increased number of profitable growth opportunities (love, 2011).   
The findings of this study provide unique insights and are relevant to corporate policy-
making and address the literary gap in Ghanaian corporate studies. It is important that 
corporate Ghana has a clear and insightful view of the critical governance factors and 
how it can influence investing decisions, as investing decisions have serious implications 
for firms’ financial performance.  
1.8 Outlook of Thesis Report 
 
This paper follows a five chapter format. The first chapter captures the background of the 
study, the research problem, the research hypothesis, research objectives, and the 
significance of the study and finally the overview of methodology. The second chapter is 
basically a review of literature broken down into sub-topics to allow a comprehensive 
review of material relevant to this study. The third chapter is a review of methods used to 
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analyze the data gathered. It discusses extensively the methods used by similar studies, 
explains the relevant variables, and clearly defines the scope of the entire data.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the analysis of the project. The chapter presents the 
findings obtained after methods discussed in the third chapter was used and supports 
findings with relevant literature.  The fifth and final chapter is a final discussion of the 
summarized results from the fourth chapter; the conclusions, observations and 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, the theory that underlines this research paper is reviewed, providing a 
range of empirical studies that supports or disagrees with the theory. The second part of 
this chapter discusses the African and Ghanaian Corporate Governance environment at 
length. The final sections of this chapter fundamentally focus on the empirical studies on 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance and the possible association between 
Corporate Governance and investing or capital budgeting decisions. It also reviews the 
results of such empirical studies. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
 
The study titled “Separation of ownership and control for board composition” by He and 
Sommer (2010) validates Fama and Jensen (1983)’s theory of separation of ownership 
and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The paper states that firms that adopt a body of 
external directors (directors who are not owners of the firm) yield efficiency in the 
decision-making process as the external board of directors monitor the operations of the 
firm (He and Sommer, 2010). This is because the adoption of more external directors 
increases the gap between ownership and control and allows managers to have 
independence in their decision-making process. Williamson (1983) is of the view that the 
theory by Fama and Jensen (1983) further advances the discourse on how corporations 
should be managed especially as they become larger in size. His argument also falls in 
line with the theory proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983) and rationalizes the assertion 
that firm size plays an important role in the need for separation of functions and roles in a 
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company. The better the understanding of the ramifications of ownership and control, the 
better various bodies of a corporation understand and develop better ways of making 
decisions which are in the interests of all stakeholders in the organization (Williamson, 
1983).  However, it must be noted that the cost to the theory of separation and ownership 
is the agency problem. Though Fama and Jensen (1983) put forth the theory of separation 
of ownership and control as the best foundations for good corporation governance, it is 
also important that there is an incentives system put in place to ensure that managers 
work to increase value maximization (Williamson, 1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
state that this incentive is expected to motivate agents’ efforts to create a total surplus. As 
such it is not enough to separate ownership, from management and control (Board of 
Directors); institutions must be put in place to ensure that the agency problem does not 
become malignant (Jensen and Meckling, 1970).  
2.3 African and Ghanaian Corporate Governance Environment 
 
Most empirical researches done on corporate governance were done on highly 
industrialized and developed countries around the world.  However, there is so much 
evolving around corporate governance in Africa that requires attention. Oman et al. 
(2004) and Allen (2005) argue that corporate governance in emerging markets has lately 
attracted much attention due to the weaknesses of corporate governance in developing 
countries, which was an important reason for a series of economic crises that have 
affected Africa. These economic crises are attributed to multitudes of problems facing 
many developing economies including issues of political instability, corruption, weak 
legislation, high levels of government intervention among others (Marashdeh, 2014). 
Aside from these problems, it is imperative that developing economies work on more 
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firm-specific challenges such as ineffective disclosure practices, weak legal frameworks,  
and the value transfer from non-controlling shareholders and stakeholders to dominate 
large shareholders as put forth by Nenova (2009), (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002).  
Corporate governance has implications for economic development especially for 
developing countries that are interested in increasing financial capital inflows and 
attaining a long term growth rate of 7 percent per annum in accordance with the 
framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Okeahalem and 
akinboade, 2003). “In 2000, the Institute of Directors (IOD) in Ghana conducted a survey 
of top 100 companies and some state-owned enterprises to investigate the current state of 
corporate governance practices in both the private and public sectors.” The results 
revealed that corporate governance has gained grounds in the country (Okeahalem and 
akinboade, 2003).   
According to Owusu and Weir, (2015) corporate governance development in Ghana can 
be attributed to the Ghanaian Companies Code 1963 and the supervision of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission Ghana (SEC) of firms listed on the stock exchange.  
2.4 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
In a study to find factors associated with firm performance, Brown and Caylor (2004) 
found a positive relationship between governance and performance after a 306 factor-
performance combination study. Among the measures of performance where return on 
equity, profit margin and sales growth by which a conclusion was drawn that good 
governance (based on factors) is related to good performance the vast majority of the 
time (Brown and Caylor, 2004). In more recent studies, Fooladi and Nikzad (2011) who 
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also adopted measures of return on equity and return on assets in investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance found a negative 
relationship between performance and CEO duality. However, despite finding positive 
relationships between performance and board independence, board size and ownership 
structure there was no significance to firm performance.  
Further studies on corporate governance have also looked at the topic in emerging 
markets and according to Klapper and Love (2004), there are many factors of corporate 
governance that can affect firm performance in emerging markets but not all of them are 
significant. However, their studies have shown that an increase in board size leads to a 
better performance when there is more diversity (Klapper and Love, 2004) but not 
necessarily the independence of the board.  Hassan Che Haat et al, (2008) in a similar 
statement with more reference on the independence of the directors on the board indicates 
that having more outside independent directors on the board improves firm performance.  
Empirical evidence on emerging markets found a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance which is in contrast to the findings by Fooladi and 
Nikzad (2011) who found a positive relationship from their study in developed 
economies. The negative relationship in Klapper and Love’s (2004) study is attributed to 
the fact that board independence is a new phenomenon in emerging economies and 
countries are yet to fully embrace the concept.  Hassan Che Haat et al, (2008) in their 
study concluded that corporate governance factors generally have a strong relationship in 
predicting company performance in Malaysian companies. These studies on emerging 
markets were done in countries such as India and Malaysia implying that there might be a 
contextual difference in an emerging market such as Africa or that the issue of corporate 
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governance and its effects on firm performance and other performance factors might 
differ from country to country. A study in the emerging market Africa with data drawn 
from listed firms from Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya over a period of 5 years 
showed that large and independent boards, CEO tenure, size and frequency of audit 
committee and sector characteristics have a positive relationship on performance with 
board activity intensity and CEO duality having a negative relationship (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2008). This is in line with other research where CEO duality and large and 
independent board size have a negative (Fooladi and Nikzad, 2011) and positive (Hassan 
Che Haat et al, 2008) relationship on board performance respectively. Kyereboah-
Coleman (2008)’s recommendation is to separate board chair from the CEO position and 
have an independent audit committee to improve performance. The resulting conclusion 
is that governance factors vary from study to study and is not necessarily based on 
whether or not the study was done in an emerging market or on a more developed 
economy. Thus, a contextual study is very important for issues on governance and firm 
performance.   
More recent empirical research on corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana 
provides a better insight on the governance factors that have a good relationship with 
performance. Owusu and Weir (2016) conducted a study on corporate governance and 
performance using the governance index of Ghana as well as other governance factors as 
the independent variables. The governance factors were used as the independent control 
variables and results disclosed that compliance of firm with the Ghanaian code is 
positively and significantly related to firm performance (Owusu and Weir 2016). Owusu 
and Weir’s (2016) results send an important signal to foreign investors that Ghana does 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS                              
17 
have a good framework for governance which attracts more investment opportunities 
worldwide particularly since it relates to firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange (Owusu and 
Weir, 2016).  Another study of the effects of corporate governance influence on working 
capital management by Ghanaian listed firms by Fiador, (2016) found that governance 
structure does affect the efficiency of working capital management which is also an 
important factor in firm performance. Also, a firm's characteristics such as its age, size 
and profitability affect its overall performance.  
Other studies have looked at the quality of firms’ governance systems as a result of the 
wake of corporate scandals questioning the practices of governances systems. A study by 
Ertugrul and Hedge (2009), states that there are very few metrics that can adequately 
measure how corporate governance can affect a firm’s performance. Despite attempts by 
corporate analysts to find viable measures that will rate the effectiveness of corporate 
governance on a firm’s performance, Ertugrul and Hedge (2009) find that there is very 
little significant relationship between the ratings found and adopted and firms’ 
performance 
2.4.1 Corporate Governance and Investing/Capital Budgeting Decisions 
 
The main established goal of capital budgeting is to maximize the economic wealth of 
owners of the firm (Pike, 1984). Board involvement in capital budgeting decision can, 
therefore, be described as the partaking of board members in the decision to undertake a 
long-term project whose profitability can be measured using Return on Assets or Return 
on Investment (Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987).  Also, according to Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992), one of the major reasons for involvement of boards in strategic decision making 
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is the increasing pressure for accountability. Aside from this, Weidenbaum (1985) has 
argued that boards’ involvement in strategic decision making is a defense against 
corporate raiders. To further support the assertion that boards and corporate governance 
systems are increasingly involved in strategic decisions, evidence provided by Heidrick 
and Struggles (1990) reports that directors are more and more involved in the monitoring 
and determination of the decisions that firms make. The issue of board involvement in 
strategic decision is considered a very complex corporate process that no one theoretical 
framework can adequately capture (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Pike (1984) examines the 
relationship between capital budgeting and corporate performance and states “that any 
attempt to measure the performance of capital budgeting outside of the corporate level 
becomes a subjective study and lacks the need for relevance” (Pike, 1984).  
The composition of a corporate governance system is very important in analyzing its 
relationship with capital budgeting decisions. Board involvement is defined by Judge and 
Zeithaml (1992) as "the overall level of participation of the board members in making 
non-routine, organization-wide resource allocation decisions that affect the long-term 
performance of an organization".  The participation of the board in decision making is 
usually necessitated by dissatisfaction that shareholders have on the return on investment 
made by managers (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). On the other hand, managers are 
expected to implement strategic decisions that are in alignment with the interests of 
shareholders if there are adequate monitoring, remuneration and compensation for the 
work that they perform (Liu and Fong, 2010). Marashdeh (2014), states that the factors 
that can critically affect the performance of the firm include board size, CEO duality, 
ownership structure such as large shareholders and managerial ownership (Marashdeh, 
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2014). Since the success of capital budgeting decision contributes to the overall 
performance of companies it is unclear whether the above-stated factors can have an 
impact on the capital budgeting decisions taken by the firms in Ghana especially since no 
research has been conducted in that respect. Due to the impact capital budgeting can have 
on firm performance, consideration must be given to the context of corporate governance 
and the capital budgeting systems of companies. These considerations must also be given 
to the allocation procedures of funds and the project appraisal techniques used and how 
they might benefit the firm (Pike, 1986). 
To highlight the fact that corporate governance can be studied in relation to capital 
budgeting, Black et al. (2006) argue that the value of corporate governance is valued 
differently by the insiders and outsiders. For example, the accounting based measures of 
performance (ROA and ROE) concern control of the wealth effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms from the viewpoint of the company management (Black et al., 
2006). Capital budgeting is a function of financial management where the function of the 
financial manager is to increase shareholders’ wealth. Myers (2001) proposed that 
perhaps the value of the firm depends on how its assets, cash flows and growth 
opportunities are utilized. Kolb (1968) also outlines that the existing theory on capital 
budgeting must call for estimations in the cost of carrying a capital budgeting project, the 
cost of capital to the firm and finally the basis for approval of the project based on the 
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The underlying conclusion from all of these related studies determines that corporate 
governance is not a remote organism in corporations. There are various factors that 
determine a governance system and to produce desirable results individual factors cannot 
be practiced in isolation. Attention must be given to factors stated above. There are 
theories that study the techniques of project appraisal and how it affects firm performance 
but there is none that looks at the outcome of capital budgeting projects in relation to the 
influence that corporate governance may have on these projects. This creates a literary 
gap for researchers in investigating capital budgeting outcomes from the standpoint of the 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses extensively the methods used by other researchers in similar 
studies and presents a framework by which data will be analyzed. The absence of this 
study makes the variables of measure for the independent variable subject to variables 
used in studies of firm performance and according to what the theory for this study 
dictates. This chapter seeks to provide a detailed description of the research design, the 
sampling strategy, data collection and intended data analysis process. 
3.2 Research Design 
 
This study is an exploratory research that used quantitative methods to analyze the 
relationships between variables of corporate governance and the outcome of investing or 
capital budgeting decisions, The regression for this research was modeled around Abor 
(2007) which is Yit = αit + βXit + ёit the subscript i denoting the cross-sectional dimension 
and t representing the time-series dimension. The left-hand variable Yit represents the 
dependent variable in the model (Abor, 2007). This model will allow for a 
comprehensive coverage of data over the five-year period (2011 to 2015). The 
independent variables however in this research are Firm Size, Board Size, Board 
Independence, CEO duality, Size of Audit Committee and Independence of Audit 
Committee (Abor, 2007), (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008). These variables were derived 
from the “Theory of Separation of Ownership and Control” and from similar studies that 
suggest that the variables stated above may have relationship with decision-making in 
organizations. 
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Three panel regressions were separately conducted on 19 companies, the 10 local 
companies only and the 9 multinationals only. According to William (1970), majority of 
firms employ Return on Investment (ROI) to evaluate performance of investment 
projects. This is because ROI gives a better post audit measure of the project success 
(Rosenblatt, 1980), (Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987). Hence the dependent variable is 
the Return on Investment.  
3.3 Research Scope 
 
Under the scope of the research the independent and dependent variables used for the 
research are defined as follows: 
• The board size refers to the number of appointed directors, who monitor the 
operations of managers in the interest of shareholders. “Organizational theory 
presupposes that larger groups take relatively longer time to make decisions and, 
therefore, more input time” (Steiner, 1972). The argument is that large boards are 
less effective and are easier for a CEO to control. There is also high cost of 
coordination and processing problems and this makes decision-making difficult 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008).  
• Board independence refers to the number of Non-Executive Directors who are on 
the board.  John and Senbet (1998) argue that a board is more independent if it 
has more non-executive directors (NEDs).  
• CEO duality refers to the board leadership structure in terms of whether the CEO 
is the same as the chairman or not (Marashdeh, 2014). The theory of agency 
supports the separation of CEO duties from chairmanship to increase board 
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independence from management. This potentially has a positive impact on firm 
performance which includes the capital budgeting decisions that firms make 
(Adams et al., 2005; Arosa et al., 2012).   
• Firm size refers to the scope of operations of a firm. According to Lee, (2015) the 
smaller the firm, the more influence institutional investors and majority 
shareholders have over management decision and are able to get access to private 
information through negotiations with management. Firm size is also included to 
allow an adequate analysis of regression under multinational and local companies. 
• The Audit Committee according to Kyereboah-Coleman (2008), represent the 
internal governance mechanism responsible for improving financial management 
and firm performance. The size of the Audit Committee is measured by the 
number of members and its independence is the ratio of non-executive directors to 
the size of the committee.  
3.3.1 Study Population 
 
The population of this study is all companies operating in Ghana; those listed and those 
not listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. 
3.4 Sampling Techniques 
 
The main sampling technique used was the Convenience sampling. Convenience 
sampling allows companies to be selected based on the availability of information of 
companies. Companies with full details of their corporate governance background over 
the period of 2011 to 2015 were selected for this study because it allows an easy and 
reliable access to data for the purpose of analysis.  
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3.4.1 Sample Sizes 
 
The sample of 19 companies as stated earlier was further divided into 10 local companies 
and 9 multinational companies to examine the various governance factors affecting the 
outcome of capital budgeting decisions. Each set of these two companies differs in size 
and sector of operation. Table 1 is a summary of firm distribution by sector and size. 
Table 1  
Firm Distribution by Sector and Size 
  Services Mining Industrial Manufacturing Total 
Local 7 0 1 2 10 
Multinational 5 3 0 1 9 
Total 12 3 1 3 19 
 
The sample size is also a mix of listed and unlisted companies to prevent the implication 
that the Security and Exchange Commission Ghana (SEC)’ guidelines on corporate 
governance measures for listed companies might have on the final results. Table 2 
presents sample firm by its listing status and size. 
Table 2 
Firm Distribution by its Listing Status and 
Size 
  Listed Unlisted Total 
Local  6 4 10 
Multinational 6 3 9 
Total 12 7 19 
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3.5 Data Collection 
 
The financial statements of companies were the primary source from which data was 
obtained. All documents such as the governance reports of companies were also among 
the sources from which data was collected.  
3.5.1 Data preparation, Collation and Processing 
 
Data were organized in Microsoft excel according to the companies and the years so that 
the relationship between the cross-sectional data and the years was clearly seen. This 
allowed a panel regression to be easily run on the variables. Panel analysis is data 
intensive and requires a thorough organization of the data from the various financial 
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3.6 Data Analysis 
 
The econometric model selected was the multiple regression as data collected has 
multidimensional features.  
Table 3  
Test of Model 




ROI 0.2216668 0.47082 
e 0.0576248 0.24005 
u 0.0430142 0,2073986 
Test: Var (u) = 0 
Chibar 2 (01) = 3.90 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0242 
In testing the accuracy of the model used in this study, the Breusch and Pagan Multiplier 
test is used. The null hypothesis states that there is no heterogeneity. From table 3 above, 
P value of the test which is 0.0242 is less that 0.05 and as such, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. This shows that the individual regressors are heterogeneous, meaning the 
samples used have different characteristics. This proves that the Robust Standard Error 
must be used to correct for the effect of heteroskedasticity and make the error term 
constant. 
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Hence, the panel regression model as used by Abor (2007) is Yit = αit + βXit + ёit, was 
used (Abor, 2007). The model specific to this research with some modification is  
ROIit = αit + β1 (NED) it + β2 (CD) it + β3 (SAC) it + β4 (IAC) it + β5 (FS) it + β6 (BS) it + ё 
Where:  
ROIit = Return on Investment for firm i in time t 
NEDit = Ratio of Non-Executive Directors to board size (measure of firm independence) 
for firm i in time t 
CDit = CEO duality (=1 if CEO is chairman, otherwise, 0) for firm i in time t 
ACSit = Size of audit committee for firm i in time t 
IACit = Independence of audit Committee for firm i in time t 
FSit = Log of the book value of assets for firm i in time t 
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Table 4  
Skewness / Kurtosis Tests for Normality 





ROI 95 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Firm Size 95 0.2634 0.2352 2.74 0.2547 
Board Size 95 0.0064 0.0133 11.37 0.0034 
Board Independence 95 0.0095 0.8957 6.33 0.0423 
CEO Duality 95 0 0.00000 
 
0.0000 
Size of Audit Committee 95 0.1047 0.0153 7.65 0.0218 
Independence of Audit 
Committee 95 0.0000 0.4394 16.92 0.0002 
 
Source: Author’s Estimate 
Table 4 above shows the results for the Jarque Berra test for normality. The null 
hypothesis for this test states that data is normally distributed. With a significance level 
of 5% and Firm Size serving as a control variable, the null hypothesis was rejected for all 
independent variables. This means the independent variable were not normally 
distributed. As such, the log forms of some of the variables were taken to make them log-
normal.  
3.7 Validity and Reliability 
 
To test the validity and reliability, the Hausman Test was conducted and the result 
showed that the Fixed Effects model should be used in the analysis of results for all 19 
companies and the 9 multinational companies only. However, the Random Effect model 
was used in interpreting results for the 10 local companies only. Breusch and Pagan 
Multiplier test was used to confirm that the Least Ordinary Squares (OLS) regression 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings from the data collected and analyzed. 
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the characteristics of the sample by 
way of descriptive statistics. The second section presents in detail the findings from the 
regression analysis conducted on the various measures of corporate governance and ROI. 
The third section relates the regression results with the initial hypotheses and fourth and 
final section relates the findings in the second section to the review of literature in 
chapter two.  
4.2 Characteristics of sample companies 
 
Return on Investment (ROI) measures the loss or gain generated from an investment 
made by a company. In this case, Return on Investment is used to measure the outcome 
of investing decisions made by sample companies over the course of five years (2011 to 
2015). As an accounting profitability measure, it is best desired for firms to obtain an 
ROI of 0.15 and above over the course of a year. The table below gives a descriptive 
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Table 5  
Descriptive statistics for ROI 
 
All companies Local Multinationals 
Descriptive 
Statistics  ROI ROI ROI 
    Mean 0.084917137 0.13113988 0.033558533 
Standard 
Error 0.047270387 0.089257917 0.010283283 
Median 0.035911704 0.035494261 0.035911704 
Standard 
Deviation 0.460734743 0.631148784 0.068982359 
Sample 
Variance 0.212276504 0.398348787 0.004758566 
Kurtosis 90.59254147 48.68630586 4.375722672 
Skewness 9.412312833 6.93817851 -1.339007867 
Range 4.701477872 4.553294282 0.414039539 
Minimum -0.223998848 -0.075815257 -0.223998848 
Maximum 4.477479025 4.477479025 0.190040691 
Count 95 50 45 
 
From table 5, all firms had a short term investing profitability ranging from 4.47 to a 
negative 0.22 which shows a very wide statistical spread between the measures presented. 
A return on investment of 0.084 represents the mean for all 19 firms. The average spread 
from the ROI is 0.46. This shows a very random set of measures and is an indication of 
the varied investment profitability of the sample companies over the five year period 
(2011-2015). The above summary statistics also indicates that the data on ROI is not 
normally distributed as skewness is 9.41. The data is right skewed because the mean is 
greater than the median. 
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The mean ROI for local companies as compared to multinational companies is greater 
with a difference of 0.09. The mean ROI for local companies also show a relatively 
higher investment profit than multinationals. With the desired ROI being 0.15 and above, 
local companies show a considerably good mean ROI of 0.13 with multinationals having 
as low as 0.03 mean ROI.   
The ranges between the ROI for both sets of companies provide an interesting 
observation. For local companies, the ROI ranges from -0.08 to as high as 4.47 while 
multinationals provide returns ranging from as low as -0.22 to a comparatively low 
maximum value of 0.19 ROI. 
The spread from the mean for local companies is as wide as 0.63 when the average ROI 
is only 0.13. The ROI data for multinationals provides something different. The spread of 
investment returns from the mean of 0.03 is only 0.06. This shows that the investment 
returns (ROI) do not vary much from one another for multinational companies but varies 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Governance Factors 
Table 6 
 Summary Statistics for Corporate Governance factors 



































8 0 1 
Size of Audit Committee 91 3.362637 1.329298 0 7 





5 0 1 
 
Source: Authors’ Estimate 
Table 6 above is a summary of the individual characteristics of the variables used for the 
multiple regression. The firm sizes from the table are not highly dispersed as the 
minimum and maximum are 6.196477 and 10.60345 respectively. The deviation from the 
mean is also of 0.816. This observation may imply that the difference between the size of 
multinational firms and local firms may not be significant. The mean log of board size is 
0.9528731 with a maximum of 1.20412 and again there is no wide dispersion of the 
board size numbers as the standard deviation is only 0.4771213. In the sample, the mean 
board independence is 0.62 indicating that many of sample companies have more Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) on their board. The spread from the mean for board 
independence is 0.217177. Also, most of these boards have the position of their CEO 
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separated from their chairmanship. The average numbers of members on the audit 
committee from the sample are a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 individuals. Some 
companies did not have an audit committee at all representing the number 0 in the table 
above. A similar situation is occurring for the independence of the audit committees 
which is meant to represent the number of Non-Executive Directors who are representing 
on the audit committees. Like board Independence, the independence of NEDs on audit 
committees show a high mean of 0.77 with a very low spread of 0.366 from the mean. 
This indicates that many of the sample firms had a large number of NEDs representing on 
their audit committee. 
 Table 7 
 Correlation Matrix of coefficients of regression model 
  
Firm 











Firm Size 1 
      
Board Size -0.0017 1 
     
Board Independence -0.1386 -0.0641 1 
    
CEO Duality 0.1538 0.3406 0.241 1 
   
Size of Audit Committee -0.03202 -0.3111 0.0373 -0.0493 1 
  
Independence of Audit Committee 0.1599 0.399 -0.1862 0.0304 -0.4904 1 
 
Constant -0.07423 -0.06119 -0.0283 -0.3851 0.3292 -0.428 1 
  
Table 7 above provides a summary of the correlation between the various independent 
variables. Most independent variables have a weak positive relationship with each other. 
The relationship matrix ranges from a high of 0.3990 representing Board Size and 
Independence of Audit Committee to a low of 0.0304 representing CEO Duality and 
Independence of Audit Committee. The negative correlations between the Independent 
variables are also not so significant. The weakest negative correlation is between Board 
Size and Firm Size, a -0.0017 indicating that the size of the Board for Ghana companies 
is irrelevant to the size of the firm. The strongest negative correlation, however, is 
between the Size of Audit Committee and the Independence of Audit Committee 
representing -0.4909 as shown Table 7. 
4.4 Regression Results 
4.4.1 Test of Heteroskedasticity 
 
One of the key assumptions of regression is that the variance of the errors is constant 
across observations. The Breusch and Pagan Multiplier test is used to test 
for heteroskedasticity. Appendix 1, shows the table for the results of the test where the 
Null Hypothesis states that there is homoskedasticity. The P value of the test which is 
0.0242 is less that 0.05 and as such, the Null Hypothesis is rejected. This proves that 
there is heteroskedasticity present in the residuals. As such, the Robust Standard Error, 
model is used in the analysis of data. This is to correct for the effect of heteroskedasticity. 
 
 4.4.2 Random and Fixed Effect Models 
 
Appendix 2 shows the Hausman test for random and fixed effect. The hypothesis on the 
result for the test of random and fixed effects states that the difference in the coefficients 
of random and fixed effects is not systematic. The results show that the null hypothesis 
should be rejected. The implication is that the random effects model cannot be used, 
hence the results of the fixed effects model in table 6 is analyzed. The fixed effect model 













 Table 8 









Source: Author’s Estimate 
ROI Coef 
Robust std. 
Err. t p>ltl 
95% Conf. Interval) 
  
Firm Size -1.093003 0.2534149 -4.31 0 -1.62541 -0.5606 
Board Size 0.8326259 0.4763676 1.75 0.098 -0.16819 1.833437 
Board Independence 0.556929 0.4150122 1.34 0.196 -0.31498 1.42887 
CEO Duality -1.050796 0.4260511 -2.47 0.024 -1.9459 -0.1557 
Size of Audit Committee 0.0421387 0.0408566 1.03 0.316 -0.0437 0.127975 
Independence of Audit Committee -0.0032596 0.4629837 -0.01 0.994 -0.0976 0.969433 
Constant 8.662832 2.119902 4.09 0.001 4.209082 13.11658 
sigma_u 0.78503338           
sigma_e 0.24005165 
     Rho 0.91449087 
     
 4.4.3 Interpretation of Regression Results 
 
Based on the results from all 19 companies from Table 8 above, Board Size, Board 
Independence, Size of Audit Committee and Independence of the Audit Committee have 
P values that are greater than 0.05 and are as such not significant. However, statistically, 
the factors used in the regression are also significant since they have a both negative and 
positive relationship with the dependent variables. However, Size of Audit Committee 
and Independence of Audit Committee economically insignificant variables with 
coefficients as low as 0.0421387 and -0.0032596 respectively.  Firm Size, CEO Duality 
and Independence of the Audit Committee have negative relationship with ROI, the 
dependent variable holding all other variables constant. However, the Board Size, Board 
Independence and Size of the Audit Committee have positive relationships with the 
dependent variable ROI. 
Based on the initial hypotheses in Chapter 1, the Null Hypotheses for Firm Size, CEO 
Duality, Board Size, Board Independence and Size of the Audit Committee are rejected. 
Conversely, the Null Hypothesis is not rejected for Independence of the Audit 
Committee. The implication is that in the case of all 19 companies, the “Theory of 
Separation of Ownership and Control” by Fama and Jensen (1983) applies to Firm Size, 
CEO Duality, Board Size, Board Independence and Size of the Audit Committee.  
The P value for the entire regression is 0.000 and is less than 0.05; hence the null 
hypothesis (HO) which states that Corporate Governance has no significance on the 
outcome of investing decisions is rejected.       
 The result here implies that generally, the independent variables which represent 
corporate governance factors have a positive relationship on the outcome of investing 
decisions taken by Ghanaian firms. 
4.4.4 Results for Individual Local and Multinational Companies 
 
The regression in Appendix 3 represents the regression results for local companies. The 
coefficients of the governance factors show statistically significant variables. For local 
companies, Board Size, Board Independence and Independence of the Audit Committee 
had a positive relationship with ROI. Per the initial hypotheses in Chapter 1, The Null 
Hypotheses of the above mentioned governance factors are rejected. The inference from 
the theory of this study is that for local companies an adequate Board Size will result in 
effective investing decision making. Also, a good representation of NEDs on the Board 
of Directors and Audit Committee will also have a positive direct effect on the outcome 
of investment decisions. 
 However, regression results as shown in appendix 4 for multinational companies show 
that Firm Size, Size of the Audit Committee and the Independence of the Audit 
Committee has a positive relationship with ROI. Though Firm Size is serving as a control 
variable, results show that value of the larger plays an important role in determining 
whether an investing decision is successful or not. From Chapter 1, the Null hypotheses 
for Size of Audit Committee and Independence of the Audit Committee will be rejected. 
This means that a sufficient number of internal directors available to audit investment 
decisions and a good representation of NEDs on the Audit Committee have a 
 corresponding positive effect on the outcome of investment decisions for Multinational 
Companies.  
4.4.5 Discussion of findings and literature 
 
Table 9 
 Summary of Regression Results 
 






All 19 Companies 10 Local Companies 9 Multinational 
Companies 










































Source: Authors’ Estimate 
 
 
 According to this study, in Ghana, there was a positive relationship between  
the outcome of investing decisions and Board Size and Board Independence and Size of 
Audit Committee for Ghanaian Companies as represented in table 6. Due to the absence 
of empirical governance studies that discuss investing decisions, the literary backing of 
findings in this section is based on firm performance.  
The positive relationship between firm performance and Board Size was echoed by 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2005) and Mak and Yuanto (2003) in their findings in 
firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia when they found that firm valuation is highest 
when the board of directors has a minimum of five, a number considered relatively large 
in developing markets. In a Nigerian study, Sanda et al (2003) found that firm 
performance was positively related with small, as opposed to large boards. From this 
research board sizes ranged from 3 to 16, a range close to the 3 to 13 range used by 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2008), in their study of firm performance and 
governance in Ghana. Their findings, therefore, supports the positive relationship 
obtained for Board Size in this study.  
CEO Duality has a negative relationship with firm performance according to Kyereboah-
Coleman (2008) study on Ghanaian firms. This study provided similar negative results. 
The best practice is to separate board chair from CEO position (Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2008). “The negative relationship connotes that when the same person holds the positions 
of board chair and CEO, it results in conflict of interest and increases agency” 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008), (Klein et all, 2005). From “Theory of Separation of 
Ownership and Control (Fama and Jensen, 1983), it can be inferred that the authors 
 support a thorough separation of all functions and heads relating to ownership, 
directorship and management.  
Fiador (2016), whose similar study was solely on Ghanaian Listed companies using the 
governance index of Ghana as independent variable revealed that for firms operating in 
Ghana, one of the most significant corporate governance factors that affect overall 
performance is the size of the firm, Likewise, Pike, (1987), stated that the size of a 
company was also known to influence the capital budgeting process and the firm’s 
performance as a whole. Though, Firm Size is the control variable measuring the size of 
multinational and local companies, the asset worth of the company may have an influence 
on overall investing decisions explaining the significant but negative relationship it has 
on ROI.  Storey (1990), explains that all firms face an identical U-shaped cost curve and 
as such small firm sizes will experience a faster growth (profitability) than larger firms.  
Coles et al (2008) concluded in their study that a positive and significant relationship 
exists between Board Size and ROI in complex firms. This study showed Board Size 
present a positive relationship but not a significant study which is in line with the theory 
of this study. Studies by Jensen (1993), Gertner and Kaplan (1996), Yermack (1996), 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) have all drawn negative conclusions for Board Size. A study by 
Eisenberg at all, (1998) concluded that many firms that showed a negative relationship 
with ROI were firms with large board sizes but does not necessarily mean that smaller 
boards are better performing. As such conclusion of empirical literature on Board Size is 
inconclusive.  
 Many studies such as those by (Drakos and Berkiris, 2010), (Bhagat and Black, 2000) 
and (Klein, 1998) found that the independence of the board does not affect the 
performance of the firm. However, the results obtained in this study showed that Board 
Independence has a positive relationship with ROI. However, Hassan Che Haat et al, 
(2008) assert in their study that having more outside independent directors on the board 
improves firm performance. Klein et al (2005) also argued that there is an importance in 
looking beyond board composition with emphasis on non-executive director 
representation.  
The results of the Audit Committee (size and independence) also reported non-significant 
variables per the results of this study but only the Size of the Audit Committee showed a 
positive relationship with ROI.  Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) also suggested that having 
an independent Audit Committee should be able to improve performance. Owusu (2012) 
study which found a positive and significant relationship with the Audit Committee Index 
in his study was consistent with the result of this study. Klein et al. (2005) also supported 
the view that certain elements of corporate governance appear to have a stronger effect on 
performance than others depending on the organization in question.  
4.4.6 Conclusion 
 
Klapper and Love (2004) in their dissertation stated that many factors of corporate 
governance are relevant but not all of them are significant and this is proven true as per 
the regression results in table 8, as three out of five non-significant factors have a positive 
relationship with ROI. Also only three out of six factors had a positive direct relationship 
with ROI and they are Board Size, Board Independence and Size of Audit Committee. 
 After classifying sample companies according to their sizes, both local and multinational 
companies presented three out of six factors having a positive relationship with the 
measure of the outcome of investment decisions (ROI). Independence of the Audit 















 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the research problem for the study and summarizes the results that 
have been obtained and discussed in chapter 4. This concluding chapter is further divided 
into sections; conclusion, recommendation, suggested further research and the overall 
limitation of the study. This final chapter also addresses the objectives as stated in 
Chapter 1 and iterates the significance of this study.  
5.2 Summary of Results 
 
It is concluded that corporate governance does have significance on the outcome of 
investing decisions made by Ghanaian Companies. From Chapter 4’s analysis, Board 
Size, Independence of the Board and the Size of the Audit Committee have positive 
relationships with the outcome of investing decisions. Hence, these are factors firms in 
Ghana must consider carefully when taking investing decisions. This conclusion 
therefore, addresses the first and initial research objective of Chapter 1. That is; to 
determine if there is a relationship between the factors of corporate governance and the 
outcome of capital budgeting decisions companies take. 
For Multinationals, it is concluded that importance must be placed on the Firm Size 
(worth of company), the Size of Audit Committees and the number of NEDs on their 
Audit Committees. For multinationals the structure, size etc. of the factors mentioned 
above are critical if they are to make an effective investment decision.  
 For local companies, attention must be given to the Board Size, the Independence of the 
Board and the Independence of the Audit Committee when making investing decisions. 
The implication is that the better the function and structures of the above mentioned 
factors, the better investing decision local companies make. The second and third 
paragraphs of the summary of results section address the second objective of this 
research. That is to examine the different factors of corporate governance that may 
influence the outcome of investing decision multinationals and local companies make.  
The relevance of this study thus demonstrates that Corporate Governance cannot be 
overlooked in making investing decisions. Based on the analysis of this study and the 
summary of results, some governance factors have positive and a direct effect on the 
outcome of investing decisions made. The implications for Ghanaian companies is that to 
be able to reap benefits on the investment projects they invested in, governance systems 
must be well structured according to the theory of this study. 
As previous studies have shown that financing decisions in Ghana are can be affected by 
poor governance, this study shows the outcome of investing decisions can be also be 
severely affected by a poor governance. Ghanaian Firms will make good corporate 
decisions once a governance structure that separates ownership from management and 
from control is in place as per the “Theory of Separation of Ownership and Control” by 
Fama and Jensen (1983), with the appropriate structure to each of these factors. Investing 
decisions overall increases the internal competitiveness of firms and eventually 
contributes to overall firm performance when sound financing decisions have been made 
as well.  
 5.3 Recommendations 
 
These recommendations are based on the variables that showed a negative relationship 
with the dependent variable Return on Investment (ROI). 
5.3.1 Recommendation 1 
 
It is also important for Ghanaian companies to keep the position of Chairmanship and 
Management distinct from each other. Since the chairman has the greatest influence over 
the actions of the board, the separation of decision making and decision control is 
compromised when the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the firm and this 
intensifies the issue of agency related problems (Abor, 2007).  
5.3.2 Recommendation 2 
 
For companies whose operations extend beyond Ghana, it is recommended that the 
number of NEDs on their Boards (Audit and Board of Directors) be larger in proportion 
to the number of directors on the board. They can contribute to decision making that 
represents the views of investors and other external stakeholders, a key dynamic in 
ensuring short-run profitability. Owusu (2012) recommends that the Audit Committee 
should comprise of a minimum of three directors with the majority being independent 
NEDs.  
5.4 Further Research 
 
Further Research on governance and investing decisions can be done by further 
categorizing the Ghanaian companies according to their industry of operations like 
 research study did by categorizing companies based on the size of companies. The table 
in the methodology section has the breakdown of companies according to their industry 
of operation which can be probed into further. This may be important in discovering 
factors that are relevant in making short run investing decisions based on sectorial 
findings. 
Also, future research should seek to include the Tobin Q’s measures as part of corporate 
governance measures in investigating the outcome on investing decisions. This is because 
companies do not operate in isolation; they exist under a macro-economic umbrella 
whose activities could have rippling effects on the investment conditions of companies.   
An inclusion of the Tobin Q’s may provide a broader insight into factors that affect 
investing decisions of companies. 
5.5 Limitation 
 
A total observation of 95 was used in this study as compared to other studies in Ghana 
that used larger observations. Owusu (2016) in his study on governance performance in 
Ghana had a total observation of 315 firms and Abor (2007) used a total of 110 
observations in his governance- financing study. The ideal sample of companies should 
have been a minimum of 300 companies to get an accurate 5% error level and confidence 
level of 95%. This situation may have undermined some aspects on the results obtained 
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Appendix 1  
Breusch and Pagan Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
        
  
ROI (Compname, t) = Xb + u (compname) + e(compname, t) 
  
Estimated Results: 
    
   
Var sd=sqrt(Var) 
   
  
ROI 0.221667 0.4708161 
   
  
e 0.057625 0.2400516 
   
  
u 0.043014 0,2073986 
   
  
Test: Var (u) = 0 
    
  
Chibar2 (01) = 
3.90 
    
  
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0242 
    
 
 
 Appendix 2  
Hausman Test 
  (b) fe (B) Re 
(b-B) 
Difference sqrt(diag(V_b-V-B)) 
 Firm Size  -1.093 -0.60357 -0.4894335 0 
  Board Size 0.832626 0.418062 0.41456367 0 
  Board Independence 0.556929 0.409003 0.1479256 0.2331195 
  CEO Duality -1.0508 -0.56186 -0.4889372 0 
  Size of Audit Committee 0.042139 0.072979 -0.0308398 0 
  Independence of Audit 
Committee -0.00033 -0.02267 0.02233944 0.3054189 
  
       b = constant  under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
    B = inconstant under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
   Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
    chi2 (6) = (b-B) (V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)) (b-B) 
     3274.54 




 Appendix 3  




Std. Err. z P> lzl 
(95% Conf. 
Interval   
Firm Size -1.107926 0.2652826 -4.18 0 -1.627871 -0.587982 
Board Size 1.149671 0.9430292 1.22 0.223 
-
0.69866326 2.997974 
Board Independence 0.4165816 0.6353029 0.66 0.512 -0.8285892 1.661752 
CEO Duality -1.091131 0.630912 -1.71 0.087 -2.341767 0.159505 
Size of Audit Committee -1.005682 0.0637983 -0.09 0.929 -0.1307241 0.1193604 
Independence of audit 
Committee 0.4356681 0.3684274 1.18 0.237 -0.2864363 1.157772 







 Appendix 4  




Std. Err. z P> lzl 
(95% Conf. 
Interval   
Firm Size 0.0027013 0.005253 0.51 0.607 -0.0075945 0.0129971 
Board Size -0.074418 0.0486939 -1.53 0.126 -0.1698559 0.0210207 
Board Independence -0.046236 0.0140399 -3.29 0.001 -0.737537 -0.018718 
CEO Duality 0 (omitted) 
    Size of Audit Committee 0.0140734 0.0034439 4.09 0 0.0073234 0.0208233 
Independence of audit 
Committee 0.0696828 0.0159565 4.37 0 0.0384087 0.1009569 
Constant -0.00833 0.0328531 -0.25 0.8 -0.0727211 0.0560609 
 
